Theory for the evolution of social interactions based on continuous strategies often assumes for simplicity that expressed behaviours are independent of previous encounters. In reality, however, such dependencies are likely to be widespread and often strong, generating complex behavioural dynamics. To model this process and illustrate potential consequences for the evolution of behavioural interactions, we consider the behavioural dynamics of the interaction between caring parents and their demanding offspring, a prime example of long series of interdependent and highly dynamic interactions. These dynamics can be modelled using functions describing mechanisms for how parents and their offspring respond to each other in the interaction. We establish the general conditions under which the behavioural dynamics converge towards a proximate equilibrium and refer to such converging interactions as behaviourally stable strategies (BSSs). We further demonstrate that there is scope for behavioural instability under realistic conditions; that is, whenever parents and/or offspring 'overreact' beyond some threshold. By applying the derived condition for behavioural stability to evolutionary models of parentoffspring conflict resolution, we show by numerical simulations that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of current models are not necessarily behaviourally stable. Because behavioural instability implies that expressed levels of behaviours deviate from the ESS, behavioural stability is required for strict evolutionary stability in repeated behavioural interactions. Ó
Theory for the evolution of social interactions based on continuous strategies often assumes for simplicity that expressed behaviours are independent of previous encounters. In reality, however, such dependencies are likely to be widespread and often strong, generating complex behavioural dynamics. To model this process and illustrate potential consequences for the evolution of behavioural interactions, we consider the behavioural dynamics of the interaction between caring parents and their demanding offspring, a prime example of long series of interdependent and highly dynamic interactions. These dynamics can be modelled using functions describing mechanisms for how parents and their offspring respond to each other in the interaction. We establish the general conditions under which the behavioural dynamics converge towards a proximate equilibrium and refer to such converging interactions as behaviourally stable strategies (BSSs). We further demonstrate that there is scope for behavioural instability under realistic conditions; that is, whenever parents and/or offspring 'overreact' beyond some threshold. By applying the derived condition for behavioural stability to evolutionary models of parentoffspring conflict resolution, we show by numerical simulations that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of current models are not necessarily behaviourally stable. Because behavioural instability implies that expressed levels of behaviours deviate from the ESS, behavioural stability is required for strict evolutionary stability in repeated behavioural interactions. Conspicuous behaviours and displays by offspring to demand resources from their parents can be observed in most animal species with parental care (Clutton-Brock 1991). According to parentoffspring conflict (POC) theory, offspring are usually selected to demand more resources from their parents than the parents should provide (Trivers 1974) . This phenomenon can be evolutionarily explained in terms of the outcome of the POC over resource distribution, where offspring begging and parental provisioning strategies reflect an evolved resolution of this conflict (Trivers 1974; Parker 1985; Godfray 1995; Kilner & Johnstone 1997; Mock & Parker 1997; Royle et al. 2002) . There are two main types of game-theoretical approaches to modelling conflict resolution. The 'scramble competition' model assumes that offspring control parental food allocation (Parker & Macnair 1979; Parker 1985; Parker et al. 2002) . The 'honest signalling' model assumes that parents control food allocation (Godfray 1991; Godfray & Johnstone 2000) . Both types of model can explain the evolution of condition-dependent, conspicuous and costly offspring begging and parental response.
These models generally assume for simplicity a single interaction, or equivalently multiple independent interactions, between parent and offspring (Maynard Smith 1982; Parker 1985; Houston et al. 1988; Godfray 1999; McNamara et al. 1999; Godfray & Johnstone 2000; Royle et al. 2002 ; but see Johnstone 1996 for a two-step exception) and the evolving strategies are taken to be adequately represented by the behavioural outcome of a one-off interaction. However, in reality the interactions between parents and offspring are behaviourally very dynamic and typically involve repeated encounters that are interdependent (McNamara et al. 1999; Godfray & Johnstone 2000) . The issue of stability has been thoroughly explored in conflict resolution models from the perspective of evolutionary stability (e.g. Takada & Kigami 1991; Rodríguez-Gironé s et al. 1998; McNamara et al. 1999 ), but it is not known whether, and under what conditions, the behavioural dynamics of repeated parent-offspring interactions allow the behaviours actually to be expressed according to the idealized strategies in the evolutionary models.
Here, we model the repeated parent-offspring interaction using a behavioural reaction norm approach (Smiseth et al. 2008) in an expanded negotiation model framework (Moore et al. 1997; McNamara et al. 1999; Taylor & Day 2004; Johnstone & Hinde 2006) , where a demand function defines how offspring adjust their begging to variation in parental provisioning, and a supply function defines how * Correspondence: R. Dobler, University of Basel, Zoological Institute, Evolutionary Biology, Vesalgasse 1, CH-4051 Basel, Switzerland.
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